

TASKS IMPORTANT TO SOLDIER SUCCESS IN STABILITY
AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

TASKS IMPORTANT TO SOLDIER SUCCESS IN STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS, by MAJ Charles W. Reed, 85 pages.

When the United States Army found itself at a crux between the end of major combat operations and the beginning of stability and reconstruction operations (S&RO) in March 2003, executing coercive and cooperative actions simultaneously beget new challenges to soldiers in a full-spectrum operation environment, such as Iraq. The Central Command (CENTCOM) commander's task list provides a document from which units can develop a training plan. Leaders preparing their units for deployment to the contemporary operating environment must ask themselves: From the CENTCOM task list, what CENTCOM tasks are most important to soldier success in stability and reconstruction operations? First, a leader must prioritize individual and collective tasks for his soldiers preparing for deployment. Next, constant determination of training task relevancy is crucial in order to keep the soldier current on tasks particular to the contemporary operating environment. Lastly, effectiveness of a unit's preparation for S&RO measured from an a priori and a posteriori view gives a commander his definition of success.

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ACRONYMS

ADA	Air Defense Artillery
AR	Army Regulation
CENTCOM	Central Command
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CTT	Common Task Test
DA	Department of the Army
DoD	Department of Defense
EST	Engagement Skills Trainer
FAS	Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability
FORSCOM	Forces Command
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OP	Observation Post
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
S&RO	Stability and Reconstruction Operations
SMCT	Soldier Manual of Common Tasks
STP	Soldier Training Publication
TF	Task Force
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Army Brigade Combat Teams have been thrust into a contemporary operating environment which, after major combat operations, requires increased Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&RO). Before units deploy, they are trained on a myriad of tasks outlined in several different documents, from higher headquarters' Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) to the Central Command (CENTCOM) task list. The problem for commanders deploying is delineating which tasks are most likely to be relevant for their unit. This relevancy is most apt to be determined by the type of enemy the unit will face and the environment in which it will face this enemy. In the past, commanders prioritized tasks based on their mission. Therefore, by understanding the effects that their unit can be expected to produce in theater, a commander can identify training tasks to be conducted in preparation for deployment. A challenge to the Army lies in the measurement of S&RO success or failure. In the absence of doctrine that deals specifically with nation-building, the Army finds itself at a loss, developing hasty reference documents on the fly. In early December 2003, Paul Mayberry, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness, said that "U.S. forces had to transition from 24/7 war operations (major combat operations) to security and stability operations, understanding these were assignments for which 'they have little or no training'" (Tiron 2004, 2). General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, likens the Army's response to this situation to that of repairing an airplane while in flight. The Army is faced with improvising rules on the fly, modifying its current major combat operations doctrine, or

creating a constantly evolving doctrine responsive to differing and rapidly changing environments.

Recognizing the importance of replicating the environment soldiers will face during deployment leads to the thesis research question: Of the CENTCOM tasks conducted during predeployment training, which tasks are most important to a soldier's success in S&RO? The CENTCOM task list that alerted units receive from theater is developed, updated, and distributed quarterly by the operations officer. Commanders develop training plans that address each task so that soldiers and units can be individually and collectively validated as "mission prepared" prior to deployment into theater. This thesis suggests that some tasks are more important than others during preparation for deployment to an S&RO. The identification of "important tasks" and subsequent training on them are important to the overall readiness of units. This must be a continuous process of mission analysis and task review or a commander can find that a soldier trained and validated on tasks today may not be ready for the Iraq of tomorrow.

Webster's New World College Dictionary defines an effect as "something that inevitably follows an antecedent" (Neufeldt 1996, 367). This thesis measures effectiveness by showing task importance as it relates to the effects that the commander intends to achieve. This is best achieved by grouping effects of unit and soldier actions into two categories: a priori and a posteriori. The "a priori" group of effects consists of those effects that are presumed to take place if certain plans are executed. Since these effects happen before military action has taken place, they are subject to much discrepancy since they are deduced. In recognizing the importance of certain tasks, the commander assumes certain resulting effects. The measurement of success lies in

achieving the effect sought and not, necessarily, in task completion. While units can train on and execute CENTCOM tasks commanders have identified as important, only the task effects constitute success. An “a posteriori” group of effects consists of those results that can be seen and inferred in a cause and effect relationship. From a commander’s standpoint, the a posteriori effects are far more palatable than the a priori group. Tried and tested tactics, techniques, and procedures during S&RO possess the value and weight to earn the title of “important.” Equating importance with success is paramount to determining on which tasks soldiers should train.

The purpose of this thesis is to determine which tasks are most important to the success of a soldier deployed to an S&RO. There has been much discussion about what the role of the Army should be after major combat operations in a hostile environment. Due to responsibilities of an occupying force, the dangers of mission creep, and the perceived threat to sovereignty by the nation occupied, the United States cannot pull out of a country it has just invaded to let indigenous civilians work out a solution on their own. Nor can the United States forever occupy a nation that it has invaded. This thesis addresses a deploying commander’s training prioritization when major combat operations are over, but the occupied nation is not ready to assume full control.

The United States Army’s preparation for S&RO missions is examined in order to determine if certain tasks result in success, thereby making them most important. By observing other methods of task prioritization during deployment training, a method of identifying those tasks that are most important to achieving success is developed. Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, prescribes forces that will provide security while civil authorities perform nation building tasks. FM 3-0

specifies ten types of stability operations: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force. This thesis focuses only on predeployment training tasks identified by the CENTCOM commander. Lastly, military officers in Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Class of 2006-01 were asked which tasks they view as most important to S&RO success.

At this point, the areas not covered by this study are addressed. First, the number and types of tasks were limited to only those listed in the CENTCOM list. Every unit has a different method of preparing for combat. Oftentimes, the CENTCOM commander task list is morphed into a training plan where CENTCOM tasks are no longer apparent. This leads to the addition or change of tasks in predeployment training. Focus is on specified versus implied predeployment training tasks. Another area not covered in this thesis is the unavailability of a noncommissioned officer's point of view, especially in the realm of the survey.

While this thesis is aimed at the causal relationship between importance and success, it is necessary to preface this study with an interpretation of importance. The importance of a task is rated according to its relevance to the contemporary operating environment. A task trained on by a soldier that is never encountered in Iraq, such as "Maintain Your M17-Series Protective Mask With Hood" (STP 21-24 SMCT 1994) would be scored low. Whereas, a task frequently encountered by a soldier, such as React To Indirect Fire While Dismounted (STP 21-24 SMCT 1994) would score high. On the other hand, as there are trained tasks encountered or not encountered, so are there

untrained tasks that are encountered or not encountered. This is especially true during an S&RO given unexpected conditions and rapid changing atmospherics. The core of this thesis is the resulting success of correctly identified important tasks on which soldiers are trained.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Determining which training tasks are most important for a unit preparing for deployment to an S&RO is complex for several reasons. First, time is of the essence for units on a deployment timeline. In accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting* (US DA 2003a, 74), units must have a training plan with a finite number of days that will bring them to full METL proficiency. Any time given to tasks that are not expected to result in success is time taken away from important tasks. Also, the second and third order effects from this selection must also be considered when weighing tasks against one another. For instance, the decision to drop “Use of Flex Cuffs” from the task list indicates a requirement for soldiers to use other means of restraint on prisoners. Logistically, flex cuffs would have to be turned in and whichever means of restraint replaces flex cuffs would have to be ordered. When commanders at any level decide where their units should focus their attention, they are in fact accepting risk on “less important” tasks. The differentiation between important and less important becomes a subjective call by commanders. Chapter 2 of this thesis points out approaches to this delineation of task rating for an S&RO environment.

Stability and Reconstruction Operations Task Importance from an A Priori Perspective

In several documents, S&RO training takes a back seat to combat training. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, states that the combat capability of Army forces is the basis for all they do (US DA 2003c, 2-21). The manual goes on to state that Army forces are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support

operations. FM 3-07 tries to stretch the application of combat tasks to support operations and denotes warfighting competencies as the only source of knowledge for units adjusting to an S&RO environment. The most important statement in FM 3-07 that applies to the research question in this thesis is: “For planned stability operations and support operations, unit commanders may adjust their battlefield training to reflect the unique aspects of these operations” (US DA 2003c, 2-22).

While FM 3-07 does not prescribe criteria to identify task importance, it does hint around the differences between major combat operation tasks and S&RO tasks. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, states that “stability operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from non-combat to combat operations and back again” (US DA 2001, 9-5). This description of a soldier’s role in S&RO implies that those important tasks chosen for training should be a mixture of lethal and nonlethal tasks.

Thomas Barnett, Senior Managing Director for Enterra Solutions and author of *The Pentagon’s New Map*, views the idea of expecting Army troops trained for combat to become peacekeepers and infrastructure and society rebuilding experts as folly (Trowbridge 2005, 33). In *The Military We Need*, Thomas Donnelly, resident fellow in defense and policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, draws a line between stability forces and combat forces, suggesting dual-tracked units to accommodate the threat (2005, 100). Both of these authors give prescriptive views of a force aptly trained to conduct S&RO.

When speaking of S&RO success, two documents give a definition that lends itself to the indigenous country in question, which in this case is Iraq. FM 1, *The Army*,

states that S&RO leads to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate (US DA 2005b, 3-7). Using this metric, S&RO success is measured inversely with the need for military involvement. A country in which the Army is conducting S&RO may have an unprecedented opportunity to finance economic venues, enhance diplomatic relations, and open information ties in order to reconstruct itself. This is due to the security offered by the occupying force, the level of assistance offered by other nations during a crisis, and the environment of change. Two themes from Illustration 1 in FM 1 are the ever-present S&RO box in all three campaign examples and the dominating S&RO box in the third joint campaign example. This chart (figure 1) is important to this thesis because of its identification of S&RO as a primary type of campaign. A campaign different enough to warrant its own classification is important enough to warrant a different training plan.




Figure 1. Types of Army Operations

Source: United States, Department of the Army, FM 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2005), 3-6.

The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* states, “The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces” US White House 2002, 29). The publication of this document one year after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center identifies the need for US forces to adapt to the contemporary operating environment. Section IX, titled “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century,” foreshadows new requirements implied as a part of S&RO. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* echoes this sentiment under the paragraph entitled “Disengagement” in Chapter III, “A Joint Force for Mission Success.” “There may be forces conducting long-term stability operations to reestablish favorable post conflict security conditions from which the United States cannot disengage” (2004, 19). Soldiers in postconflict security conditions can be expected to have different mindsets and challenges than soldiers in pre-conflict and conflict conditions. Training tasks that deal with the latter two conditions have historically taken precedence over the former. The need to identify and integrate S&RO requirements of the State Department was recently recognized in National Security Presidential Directive 44 dated 7 December 2005: “The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist the Secretary to . . . develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine” (2005, 2).

Doctrine prescribing for Army forces the necessary tasks for an operation other than war environment was envisioned in the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*.

“Doctrine was versatile to enable forces to deal with the gamut of challenges, including drug-trafficking, disasters, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, and extremist acts anywhere in the world. Doctrine had to be sufficient to enable a force to shift rapidly between types of commitment” (Romjue 1996, 114). When making a predeployment training plan, commanders reach a decision point that will identify tasks in one of three ways: train their soldiers to succeed in major combat operations, train their soldiers to succeed in S&RO, or train their soldiers to succeed in both. Since any doctrine that leans either towards major combat operations or only towards S&RO will force a commander to take risk in the area that he does not emphasize importance, any doctrine that addresses both types of operations is a great tool for predeployment training. Along this train of thought, a task’s importance can be determined by its relevancy to both major combat operations and S&RO.

Stability and Reconstruction Operations Task Importance from an A Posteriori Perspective

Creative methods of replicating the contemporary operating environment can be found in computer-aided designs. Examples of these designs can be found commercially, in the Future Combat System acquisition process, and in Army and Marine inventories. Use of this new technology lends cutting edge realism to soldiers preparing for an S&RO.

Negotiation scenarios are replicated in the Institute for Creative Technologies’ “Unreal” commercial game engine (2005, 1). The virtual reality program links experiences of the soldier to visual references to help him remember the experiences. Scenarios of the “Unreal” game provide soldiers headed into a peacekeeping mission a chance to rehearse engagements as never before.

Another training tool available to deploying units is the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST). EST provides realistic marksmanship and combat scenario training for twelve of the most common small arms and crew-served weapons and individual antitank weapons in the Army inventory (US DA 2004a, 1). Introduced in 2003, EST is available through the Training and Support Center of every major Army installation. By replicating actual engagements experienced by troops in Iraq, EST is as current as the operator wants it to be.

The Marine Corps War Fighting Laboratory has developed a Stability and Support Operation Mission Rehearsal Exercise that “reflects current operational requirements and comprises an eight-day schedule. Specific events include five days of SASO-specific training events and a three-day Final Exercise based on current theatre-specific requirements” (US Marine Corps Concepts 2004, 4). If relevancy is an indicator of task importance, this Mission Rehearsal Exercise includes the necessary updates to warrant participation of deploying troops.

The Army’s National Training Center, once a breeding ground for simulated conventional force-on-force battles of Army units against a linear and mounted opposing force, has also kept up with changing requirements, adopting “a great emphasis on stability and support operations . . . to reduce the emphasis on major fights, understanding that these are still combat operations and very lethal, but they are not armored congregations that we put in the past” (Tiron 2004, 2). The National Training Center’s ability to stay relevant is based on its replication of the mission, enemy, troops, time and terrain encountered by soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

TRADOC has sponsored several special focus teams to identify important tasks that counter contemporary operating environment threats. To name a few: TF IED was created in October 2003 by General Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, to counter the increasing US casualties from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (Lovelace 2005, 31); a counterstrike task force was stood up to focus on mortar attacks on forward operating bases; and other special focus teams have addressed threats from insurgents armed with surface-to-air missiles (2005, 31).

In his article “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won,” LTC (R) Conrad Crane, Director, US Army Military History Institute, also identifies the assumption of responsibilities by indigenous organizations as an eventual endstate in S&RO (2005, 13). Figure 2 gives Crane’s ideal vision of transition, with US civilian organizations taking over S&RO from the US military and later handing off S&RO to indigenous organizations.

What Crane states as reality is in figure 3, which shows the US military involved over a longer period of time and handing off S&RO to indigenous organizations with US civilian organizations playing a minor role and hardly involved.

In narrowing down tasks important to soldiers in an S&RO capacity, Colonel Kevin Benson, a planner for CENTOM during Operation Iraqi Freedom and current Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, stated that by “looking at the country itself and the cities and the flashpoints of where we could get the most effect for use of the forces we had . . . we targeted (US) forces in the terms of the specified tasks we gave to the Corps and subsequently to the multinational divisions” (DeToy 2004, 197). The switch to S&RO was demanding on the deployed Army, given the uncertainty




Figure 2. Ideal Vision of Transition

Source: LTC (R) Conrad C. Crane, *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won. Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign Conference*. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 14-16 September 2005.), 13.




Figure 3. Realistic Vision of Transition

Source: LTC (R) Conrad C. Crane, *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won, Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign Conference* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press. 14-16 September 2005.), 13.

of the contemporary operating environment. “In counterinsurgency warfare, a regular army must make changes to its organization and tactics since regular forces normally seek to concentrate in time and space to obtain decisive victory quickly, while guerillas take the opposite approach, dispersing in time and space to avoid defeat” (Witty 2006, 408). This change in the norm is often recognized by contemporary authors, highlighting S&RO as something here to stay. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Lacquement, an instructor at the United States Naval War College and author of “Shaping Military Capabilities After the Cold War,” believes that it is essential to change the outbox (plan to pass off the reconstruction effort to the next organization) mentality, because frequently there will be no such organization to take charge. The US Army is the usual answer to who is responsible for reconstruction (Lacquement 2005, 2).

Example Task Lists from Which to Choose

In order to build a model from which task importance can be determined, seven example task lists illustrate the results of such a process: the Army’s Common Task Test (CTT) task list; the task list for Bosnia deployment; DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” task list; CENTCOM predeployment task list; Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) force task list; the 1st Cavalry Division’s Pegasus Calm; and DA 600-8-101 “Personnel Processing.”

In Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 500-3-3, the unit chain of command is tasked to develop the training plan and support requirements and “of those selected for training prior to (deployment), determine which tasks require additional training to achieve standard” (US DA 2003e, 39). Considering all these sources and their

similar identification of the need to prioritize tasks, commanders are thus charged with task selection. A commander, or his representative, certifies soldiers as trained by signing DA Form 7425, Readiness and Deployment Checklist (See Appendix C), thereby validating the soldier for deployment. Special attention should be given to Section VI, Training, Block Number 9 - Theater specific training requirements completed. It is this block where a soldier is validated on tasks identified by the Combatant Commander or Combined Forces Land Component Commander as important.

The Department of the Army's Soldiers Training Publication (STP) 21-24, *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks* (SMCT), states that the noncommissioned officer determines which tasks, of the 86 tasks in the manual, soldiers need to train on using the commander's training strategy as guidance. "The unit's METL, the Army Training and Evaluation Program, and the CTT plan, located in STP 21-24-SMCT, are sources for helping the trainer define the individual training needed" (1994, 3). Juxtaposed to the noncommissioned officer's paring down of STP 21-1-SMCT tasks is the CTT list "based on common task nominations solicited from a variety of Army commands and agencies:

1. Major Army Commands and the Army Reserve Army National Guard nominate tasks that are critical to battlefield survival and unit mission accomplishment.
2. Combat Training Centers nominate tasks in which units have demonstrated low proficiency during exercises.
3. Center for Army Lessons Learned nominates tasks based on after action reports from annual Combat Training Centers rotations and Take Home Packages, after action reports from major exercises and operations, and lessons learned from real world operations. (STP 21-24-SMCT 1994, 1)

The United States Army Europe required the following tasks to be completed by all soldiers deploying to a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 1998:

1. Media Awareness briefing
2. Mine Detonation
3. Rules of Engagement
4. Mine Awareness
5. Counter-Mine Operations
6. First Aid
7. Convoy Operations
8. Environmental Threat
9. Situational Awareness
10. Force Protection
11. Patrolling
12. React to Sniper
13. React to Indirect Fire
14. Evacuate a Casualty
15. Negotiate trip wires, mine fields, and booby traps
16. Interact with Host-Nation Personnel
17. Media Interviews
18. Vehicle Search
19. Personnel Search (Stammer 1998, 3)

At the operational level, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 outlined the following twelve tasks for US military forces in Stability, Security,

Transition and Reconstruction Operations:

1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.
2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure.
3. Develop representative governmental institutions
4. Integrated civilian and military efforts key to successful stability operations.
5. Military-civilian teams are a critical US Government stability operations tool.
6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the DOS and other US departments and agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.
7. DOD shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere.
8. Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate.
9. DOD shall support indigenous persons or groups - political, religious, educational, and media - promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians.
10. DOD intelligence efforts shall be designed to provide the optimal mix of capabilities to meet stability operations requirements, taking into account other priorities.
11. Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.
12. Information shall be shared with US departments and agencies, foreign governments and forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the

private sector supporting stability operations, consistent with legal requirements (DOD 2005, 4).

According to DA PAM 600-8-101, *Personnel Processing*, the Battalion S2, S3 and unit commander are responsible for nine deployment tasks. Of these tasks, five are training related:

1. Ensure all soldiers receive an orientation on the missions of their deployed/deploying units
2. Ensure all soldiers pending deployment OCONUS attend Antiterrorism Force Protection Level 1
3. Ensure all soldiers are qualified on their individual weapons per the requirements of their current duty positions and that soldiers who are issued one or more weapons for the deployment receive familiarization training before departure
4. Ensure all soldiers in the ranks of SFC and below are trained and tested as necessary on the locally required elements of the CTT before movement
5. Reviewing/updating the soldiers' training records (US DA 2003b, 39).

These five predeployment training mandates overlap with the CTT manual and FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-1 which states that the unit's METL, based primarily on OPLANs and external directives relating to a unit's wartime mission, is used to form training plans (US DA 2003e, 187).

The following SASO tasks are identified by CENTCOM as predeployment tasks to be trained on before deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (as of November 2005):

4. SASO Tasks

A. Squad/Platoon Tasks

- (1) Conduct a personnel search
- (2) Conduct a vehicle search
- (3) OP [Observation Post] operations
- (4) Convoy operations
- (5) QRF [Quick Reaction Force] operations

- (6) Cordon and Search operations
- (7) Urban operations

B. Company Tasks

- (1) Convoy operations
- (2) QRF operations
- (3) Cordon and Search operations
- (4) Urban operations
- (5) Operate CP [Command Post]

C. Battalion Tasks

- (1) Liaison with outside agencies
- (2) Plan QRF operations
- (3) Plan for Force Protection
- (4) Plan/Conduct convoy operations
- (5) Plan/Conduct media relations
- (6) Coordinate with SOF [Special Operations Forces]

D. Brigade Tasks

- (1) Plan for Force Protection
- (2) Conduct IO [Information Operations]

In his monograph, “To Support and Defend: An Evaluation of the Requirement For a Specialized MOOTW Force,” Major John DeJarnette, an Army engineer officer and 2001 SAMS graduate, gives the following list of tasks (see table 1) pertinent to the soldier deploying to an S&RO theater. While Major John DeJarnette acknowledges that conventional military forces are optimized for combat operations and not MOOTW, he draws parallels between certain branches of the Army that are suited best when shoehorned into the S&RO mission (for example, military police, engineers, and others) (2001, 29).

In Appendix 9 of *Pegasus Calm*, the First Cavalry Division’s standard operating procedure for Stability and Support Operations (SASO), eight areas are identified

requiring increased training emphasis in preparation for SASO: Rules of Engagement, Cordon and Search, Media, Counter-sniper, Checkpoint, Enter and Clear a Building/Room, Negotiation, and Road Marches/Convoys (US DA 2003f, I-C-9-1). The appendix goes on to break out individual and collective tasks specific to a SASO environment. This prioritization gives units tasks, conditions and standards in a Mission Training Plan format.

Table 1. Military Operations Other Than War Tactical Tasks
Patrolling Broker Agreements Communicate Among Parties Implement Demobilization And Disarmament Clear Mines and Unexploded Ordnance Assist With Food Distribution, Water Production and Basic Sanitation Alert NGOs of High Threat Areas Negotiate with Warring Factions Provide Physical Security for Aid Delivery Provide Physical Security for Refugee Camps Restore Law and Order Conduct Forcible Separation of Belligerents Establish Safe Areas Guarantee or Deny Freedom of Movement Enforce Sanctions

Source: Major John C. DeJarnette, “To Support and Defend: An Evaluation of the Requirement for a Specialized MOOTW Force” (Monograph, School for Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2001).

Stability and Reconstruction Operations Task Selection Based on Success Measurement

In an analysis for the Brookings Institute, Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz collected security, economic, and public opinion data from Iraq between November 2003 and November 2005. In their resulting article “The State of Iraq: An

Update,” their data, in tabular form, shows progress. Over a three-year period, Iraqi military fatalities, US troop presence and insurgents increase. Over this same three-year period, resolved court cases, Iraq’s Gross Domestic Product and fuel availability increase. This shows that success can be defined by criteria set by the observer, who can choose an instrument of national power that bolsters his argument based on his own agenda. This observer can interpret success or failure at his discretion using security statistics to argue failure, and economic statistics to argue success.

If an increase in the amount of tips received is considered success, then that indicator has increased thirtyfold from November 2003 to November 2005. However, if decreased US troop presence is an indicator of success, then the 37,000 increase over the same three year period would indicate lack of success. During an interview with American Broadcast Company, World News on 14 December 2005, General George Casey, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq , defined success as “An Iraq with a representative government that supports the human rights of all Iraqis and security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terror” (Vargas 2005, 1). While this definition is at the strategic level, it provides top-down guidance with which units from Multi-National Corps in Iraq and below can develop unit METLs. Obviously, supporting tasks for the multinational forces in Iraq’s goals would be abundant, but by limiting the goals to two over-arching themes, General Casey prioritized.

LTC William Ostlund, an Army officer assigned to J5, Strategic Command, writes in the 21 November 2005 issue of the *Army Times* that the Army’s ability to learn and adapt makes it more than fitting for S&RO in Iraq. Regarding training, LTC Ostlund

posits, “What are the measurements that indicate ‘adequately trained?’ Is ‘adequate training’ a matter of specific training? Is there a nonmilitary training center with a validated curriculum that addresses the complexities and nuances associated with reconstituting an entire country?” (2005, 50). While LTC Ostlund’s questions are merely in defense against critics of the Army’s performance in Iraq thus far, his identification of no clear standard for the contemporary operating environment begs the possibility of immeasurability. This could be construed as an obstacle to determining the importance of training tasks for such an environment.

Table 2. The State of Iraq: An Update

	NOV/03	NOV/04	NOV/05		NOV/03	NOV/04	NOV/05
SECURITY INDICATORS				ECONOMIC QUALITY INDICATORS			
U.S. Troop Fatalities	82	137	96	Crude Oil Production (millions)	21	2	2
Iraqi Military/Police Fatalities	65	160	176	% Household Fuel Availability	76	77	87
Estimated Iraqi Civilian Fatalities from War	125	1500	600	Average Electric Power (megawatts)	36	32	37
Multiple-Fatality Bombings	6	11	41	Annual GDP (billions)	19	28	29
Kidnappings of Foreigners	1	5	11	Cumulative U.S. Aid (billions)	0.1	36	12
U.S./Other Foreign Troops (thousands)	123/24	138/24	160/23	Registered Cars (millions)	1.5	25	31
Iraqi Security Personnel (thou)	95	114	212	% Unemployment Rate	50	35	32
Number of Iraqi Security Personnel in Top Two Tiers of Quality (thousands)	0	5	35	Felony Cases Resolved in Courts	50	700	850
Estimated Number of Insurgents	5,000	20,000	18,000	Telephone Subscribers	600,000	2,200,000	5,000,000
Daily Insurgent Attacks	32	77	90				
Daily Tips Received from Iraqis about Insurgents	5	10	150	PUBLIC OPINION/POLITICS			
				% of Public Optimistic about Future	65	54	49
				Iraqis Favoring Near-Term U.S. Troop Withdrawal	30	75	80
(Kamp, page 2)				% Expected Sunni Arab Share of Iraq's Future Oil Revenue	20	20	5-10

Source: Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz, “The State of Iraq: An Update” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 14 December 2005) [database on-line];

available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20040810.htm>; Internet;
accessed on 14 December 2005.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

There are three approaches to paring down a laundry list of tasks to a more manageable and relevant level. Whichever method is selected, the process results in a list that can resolve the problem of identifying important tasks contributing to a soldier's success in S&RO in Iraq. CTT, METL development, and the CENTCOM deployment task list development are methods in which units highlight a set of tasks out of a larger number in order to give focus to soldier training. By examining the processes used to develop the above task lists, a similar process can be constructed to identify which tasks are most important to a soldier's success in S&RO in Iraq.

Common Task Testing Development

The first technique of task selection is applied by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in its development of the CTT. This is an annual hands-on evaluation of a soldier's proficiency on critical common tasks (US DA 2004b, VI-13-1). Leaders are required by TRADOC to maintain CTT files on every soldier in their unit.

At first glance, the CTT development process appears to be an annual event, not flexible to change during the fiscal year. However, there are instances where conditions in the contemporary environment can alter the list. For example, after receiving guidance from TRADOC, Michael Gravens the III Corps Command Sergeant Major, gave all the senior noncommissioned officers in the corps the following guidance, "Below are three new added common tasks for our Army reference access control points, this is pertinent training, stateside or overseas." In another example, Major Chet Geyer, an Army National

Guard advisor to the Army Training Support Center, bases new and revised tasks for inclusion in CTT on the unit's Contemporary Operating Environment METL (Geyer 2004, 3). These illustrate leader willingness to change the norm to adapt to the environment.

Several instances in Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-24-SMCT lend themselves to definitions of "task importance." This manual lists "tasks that will help you fight better and survive on the battlefield" (US DA 1994, 1-1) as candidates for the CTT list. Tasks are identified as important whose "results identify soldiers who need training on specific tasks" (US DA 1994, 1-1). Lastly, CTT tasks are grouped into five categories that leaders can use in assessing their soldier's performance:

1. Soldier tasks which support the unit's METL
2. Soldier tasks which support other non-METL unit tasks as shown in the Army Training and Evaluation Program Mission Training Plan
3. Soldier tasks identified by higher headquarters for inclusion in planned individual training
4. Soldier tasks showing substandard unit performance on previous training feedback such as the Self-Development Test, the Common Task Test, or annual general inspections
5. Soldier tasks relevant to the soldier's Military Occupational Specialty but not required in his current duty assignment (US DA 1994, 1-1)

The category of tasks listed in number five above is contradictory to other definitions found in this thesis of task importance in this thesis. This could be because of the identification by CTT input agencies of the importance of keeping soldiers honed on their warfighting skills, no matter the circumstances. One could also argue that this reasoning is out-of-date with S&RO. Tasks not required to be completed in a current duty assignment will subtract training time away from those tasks that are being conducted in

a current duty assignment. Regardless, the STP listed these categories so leaders could formulate a training plan based on tasks deemed important by Major Army Commands, Combat Training Centers, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned .

Common Task Testing as It Applies to Soldiers in Stability
and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

“It’s important for us to know how to deal with (livestock) so that soldiers don’t get hurt, so the livestock doesn’t get hurt and so we don’t damage people’s property. (Dealing with livestock) is useful in maintaining good relations with Iraqis. A soldier from the unit saw U.S. forces’ need to deal with livestock on his last deployment to Iraq” (Thompson 2006, 6).

Requirements of S&RO have transcended previous predeployment training requirements. However, the need for the identification of tasks, conditions, and standards remains the same. Instead of the usual tasks, conditions, and standards applied to Army training events involving a soldier’s warfighting skills, a better fit for the contemporary operating environment might be tasks, conditions, and effects. Unpredictable and unintended effects, from the soldier’s point of view, could be the result of task completion. An example of this would be trainers allowing civilians on the training battlefield to react in accordance with Iraqi responses to soldier actions. If the CTT model is applied to S&RO, a unit’s METL would build around the area of Iraq in which it operates and every unit’s METL would differ from other units in neighboring provinces. Effects desired from higher headquarters would come through the same chains as CTT tasks did before, with the same leeway for units to modify the task list based on experiences in theater.

The feedback measure of performance during CTT can also be used to assess soldier success in an S&RO in Iraq. Feedback, whether it is from the individual soldier going through training or from another party, can assist leaders in identifying task importance. First, feedback has to return to the trainer in two forms: feedback after a task has been trained on and feedback after a task has been executed in theater. The former type of feedback would give insight to the task's feasibility. This type of feedback is also indicative of "a priori" training geared towards preparing soldiers from a deductive standpoint. For instance, a trainer trying to mimic an IED explosion may find that the jolts, vibrations, and shock effect associated with an IED exploding cannot be justly reenacted (worthwhile, but unfeasible). However, construction of a small, urban town for urban operations training may prove worthwhile (and feasible).

Feedback is of "a posteriori" nature whenever its application comes after intended effects are achieved through trial and error. An example of this would be the placement of IEDs inside of animal carcasses subsequent to reports of these insurgent actions from units in Iraq (suitable). Trainers that hire civilian contractors to conduct a riot that do not speak Arabic nor wear clothes representative of Iraqi culture are not meeting suitability criteria.

As previously mentioned, tasks not relevant to an S&RO in Iraq (which could include some basic warfighting skills) would take a back seat to tasks that are being experienced in the postconflict environment if the criterion of "relevant to the unit mission" is emphasized as more likely. Realistically, S&RO-specific tasks may only represent a portion of an Army-wide mandated training task list because the failure of an

S&RO task results in a delay of Iraq's nation building whereas the failure of a basic warfighting skill results in casualties.

In the top left box of table 3, one can observe a task common to soldiers in Iraq that was identified early enough to include in a training task list. True, the task may have been emphasized after indirect fire attacks inflicted casualties, but its importance was cemented in the fact that a leader identified the need to train on "React to Indirect Fire." The existence of a task trained on but not encountered, as seen in the top right box, may need to be reconsidered if there is no justification from the contemporary operating environment to keep training on this task.

Table 3. Tasks Encountered or Not Encountered		
	Encountered	Not Encountered
Trained	React to Indirect Fire	React to a Nuclear Attack
Untrained	Speak Farsee Dialect	Conduct Maintenance on an M982 FIST-V

Mission Essential Task List Development

The second technique, METL development, is conducted in accordance with the unit's mission. Normally, METL development is conducted in conjunction with a unit's change of mission, change of commander, or any other re-alignment of the unit requiring the change of its training plan. Commanders and their staffs develop METL that is embedded in and supports their higher headquarters' METL. Usually limited to five to

seven tasks, METL is further subdivided into supporting collective tasks derived from a Mission Training Plan.

FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, and FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, denote five primary inputs to a unit's METL:

1. Wartime Operational Plans
2. Enduring Combat Capabilities
3. Operational Environment
4. Directed Missions
5. External Guidance (US DA 2003d, 3-3)

Initially, the METL development process is staff driven, taking all the relevant inputs and briefing the commander in a mission analysis format. As mentioned earlier, five to seven METL tasks is the normal number of tasks on which a unit will focus. "The METL development process reduces the number of tasks the organization must train and focuses the organization's training efforts on the most important collective training tasks required to accomplish the mission" (US DA 2002a, 3-2).

The METL process is a realization that it is unrealistic for a unit to train on every possible task in the Army inventory. On one end of the spectrum, a commander could choose one task, train his unit on that one task, and subsequently be the best unit in conducting that task. On the other end of the spectrum, is a unit commander who treats every task in the Army inventory with equal footing, thereby exhausting his unit and conforming to the "Jack of All Trades, Maser of None" school of thought. The commander who pairs down his METL to a working document that is suitable, feasible, and acceptable to his unit falls somewhere in between.

A forum, such as a Quarterly Training Brief or Company Training Brief, allows commanders two levels up from the unit briefing to see what their subordinate units' training plans have become. The METL becomes a contract between a commander and his boss on the unit's training focus. A disadvantage of METL-development to the identification of task importance is its subordinate task selection process from a military occupational specialty-specific Mission Training Plan. This limits the commander to tasks that may not be applicable to an S&RO environment. Therefore, "buy-in" from higher headquarters on METL tasks and supporting collective tasks not listed in the unit's Mission Training Plan is vital.

From a feedback standpoint, METL tasks are usually assessed by the commander using a "T" for "trained," a "P" for "Proficient," or a "U" for "Untrained" in deciding where his unit stands on any given task. This assessment, when applied to both the "a priori" and "a posteriori" point of view can assist the commander in task importance identification.

Giving a unit a T, P, or U for a task trained on during predeployment training can have an infinite number of results for the unit, depending on the commander. A unit given a "T" for a task may be considered validated for deployment. Often, a "P" assessment is good enough for everyone involved to move on to another task. It is the "U" assessment that gets attention, resulting in either retraining, task modification, task deletion, or a myriad of other solutions to "get rid of the 'U.'" This subjective assessment is another disadvantage of the METL assessment process, but can be modified for use in S&RO preparation.

Mission Essential Task List Development as It Applies to Soldiers in
Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

In determining which tasks are important to a soldier's success in S&RO in Iraq, one can look through the METL development's lens to derive "a way" of task selection. S&RO-specific tasks can be listed as they are encountered for the Army as a learning organization. Supporting collective tasks that fall under the five to seven METL tasks are determined by staff and commanders with the reasoning that proficiency in each supporting collective task will result in overall proficiency in the METL task. Adjusting for an S&RO in the same manner, overarching METL task categories with associated supporting collective tasks may look like this:

1. METL Task: TRAIN THE IRAQI POLICE

Supporting Collective Tasks:

- A. Establish a SWAT Team
- B. Recruit Local Police Force
- C. Conduct Foot Patrol
- D. Involvement with Community
- E. Negotiate a Hostage Crisis
- F. Interrogation Techniques
- G. Accident Investigation
- H. Self-Defense
- I. Sniper Training

2. METL Task: FORM COMMUNITY INTRAMURAL SPORTS PROGRAM

Supporting Collective Tasks:

- A. Advertisement of Services
- B. Train the Trainer Coaching
- C. Public Affairs Coverage
- D. Equal Opportunity
- E. Brackets and Scoring
- F. Playing Field Security
- G. First Aid

3. METL Task: HOLD AN ELECTION

Supporting Collective Tasks:

- A. Polling Site Security
- B. Fraud Prevention
- C. Voting Logistics
- D. Postelection Ballot Management
- E. Public Education on Voting Procedures
- F. Site Disruption Contingency Plans

As soon as standards and desired effects are decided, published, and agreed upon, S&RO task lists can have the same visibility as METL.

The question becomes: Is an S&RO task list in place of or in addition to a warfighting METL? This thesis is not designed to answer the question of whether a force can take on two different roles, or whether or not a unit specifically designed for S&RO is needed. This issue has been addressed by several authors, including former United Nations ambassador Jack Danforth, who: “envision[s] a standing coalition with military capabilities that could respond more decisively” (Canon 2005, A6). Sometimes called a “major combat operations unit,” “legacy unit,” or a unit that accomplishes its mission using only lethal means fits the bill to Ambassador Danforth’s postulate. According to the Hart-Rudman Commission, “a compelling argument for changing the structure and focus of portions of the Army to more effectively support the National Security Strategy” (DeJarnette 2001, 2) indicates a need for a MOOTW force. However, Major DeJarnette also states that the low-level tactical tasks required in MOOTW are essentially the same tasks that are required in war (2001, 1).

If an S&RO task list falls into the METL development model, it meets the three criteria of the “Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability Test” (FAS Test). The

development of the S&RO task list illustrated above is suitable in that it includes tasks that soldiers should not have difficulty in grasping if trained with tasks, conditions and effects desired. The three METL tasks would be acceptable because they occur frequently. This method is feasible in that S&RO tasks are determined in theater and bound by the environment in which a unit is operating. After higher headquarters approval, supporting collective tasks would have to change much more often than the leeway offered by the CTT model due to the ever-changing conditions present in Iraq.

In order to measure task importance, definitions must be given for each of the three criteria. Suitable is defined as that task which meets objectives in theater and thereby most measurable. For example, if an objective is to restore electricity to a city, the task of “Engaging a Target with Indirect Fire” would not be very suitable.

“Of particular concern, it does not seem the coalition had forces properly tailored to accomplish the main objective of the campaign” (Carafano 2003, 3).

Feasible is the ability for a task to be trained on. “Speaking Arabic” may be suitable, but given the time for a soldier to learn the language and dialect for a particular area of Iraq is not feasible. Lastly, the acceptability criterion is the frequent occurrence of a scenario that justifies a task’s importance. Acceptability is also used to describe any tasks that soldiers are not proficient in, thereby justifying its importance.

Central Command Deployment Task List Development

The last technique most applicable to the selection of important tasks to soldier success in S&RO in Iraq is the CENTCOM deployment task list process. While contributors to the CTT list are Unified Combatant Commanders, the CENTCOM deployment task list, in chapter 2 of this thesis, is particular to Central Command. As the

fourth category of tasks on the list, SASO tasks is the closest thing to S&RO and the Squad-Platoon level tasks is the closest level to the individual soldier.

When applying the FAS Test to the seven areas under Squad-Platoon level SASO tasks, one can see how prioritization occurred in the CENTCOM task list development. It is important to revisit FM-1's definition of S&RO before proceeding with an assessment of CENTCOM tasks with regard to the FAS Test.

Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies. S&RO involves both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. S&RO missions lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate. (US DA 2005b, 3-7)

Table 4 shows scores for tasks done in an S&RO environment. Weight for FAS based on a recurring theme in this thesis: relevance equals importance. One can see that as tasks move across full spectrum operations from major combat operations to S&RO that those tasks dealing with warfighting become less suitable, less feasible and less acceptable. In the chart above, convoy operations and urban operations emerge as "most important." This is because of the weighting of frequency (or relevance) with the highest number and subsequent comparison against the other two criteria (feasible and suitable).

If a commander does not know what theater objectives are, he is choosing importance based on what is best for his troops: dealing with the here and now. "If you're an Army officer in Iraq right now, you're focused on the immediate solution, which is how to protect your people from improvised explosive devices and suicide car bombs" (Grant 2005, 15). Conversely, the inability for units to achieve success in S&RO-type

missions for whatever reason forces emphasis on those tasks that occur frequently or are easy to do.

Unfortunately, the SASO tasks identified in the CENTCOM predeployment task list do not match up with S&RO requirements, nor does it include a list of supporting collective tasks. Although, it is presumed that units tasked to deploy to Iraq take the CENTCOM task list and transform it into a METL that they can train towards, there is not documentation available on this process.

Table 4. Feasibility Acceptability and Suitability Test Applied to Task Importance.							
S&RO (Weight)	Conduct a Personnel Search	Conduct a Vehicle Search	OP Ops	Convoy Ops	QRF Ops	Cordon and Search Ops	Urban Ops
Feasible (2) “Meets Objectives”	2	2	2	2	1	3	2
Acceptable (3) “Frequency of Occurrence”	1	1	1	3	2	1	3
Suitable (1) “Doable, Trainable”	3	3	3	1	3	2	1
Total	10	10	10	14	11	11	14
(Weight Times Score)							
*In both weight and scoring, higher is better.							

Central Command Deployment Task List Development as It Applies to Soldiers in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

It is imperative that before any unit begins training for deployment, the criteria for determining task importance are chosen. These criteria serve as building blocks for a unit's modified CTT, METL and theater-specific requirements. By identifying what is important first, commanders can save much time and effort spent on tasks that are either irrelevant to the current operating environment, do not meet objectives, or are too manpower dependent to resource.

If one begin the construction of a training plan with the effects one want to achieve, time and resources can be concentrated and prioritized in the initial stages of training. The CENTCOM task list included seven task categories that were specific to Iraq. If one were to go a step further and assign supporting collective tasks under these categories that were specific to an area within Iraq, soldiers would have a greater chance of being successful due to the increased relevance of the tasks.

Iraq can be subdivided into eighteen political and or ethnic provinces (see figure 4). Soldiers deploying to the Ninawa province may have a different definition of task importance than soldiers deploying to the Wasit province. It may be important for soldiers conducting S&RO in any of the Northern provinces to have a working knowledge of Kurdish standards, energy sources from Syria, or relations with Turkey that soldiers operating in southern provinces do not deem as important.




Figure 4. Political Map of Iraq

Source: University of Texas Library, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, Political Map of Iraq, 1996 [database on-line]; available from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol96.jpg; Internet; accessed on 14 October 2005.

In summation, task importance defined by its relevancy equates to the geographical compartmentalization of unit mission focus. By narrowing the playing field, a practice more apt to be accomplished in an S&RO environment than a major combat operation, one can prioritize tasks based on effects particular to the area of Iraq to which soldiers will be deploying.

Survey Instrument

The survey in appendix A was used to query graduate-level, military officer, students in CGSC to get a primary source of data that shows relative importance between CENTCOM tasks. CGSC students make up a target population of approximately 1,100

respondents. The CGSC body contains a vast body of knowledge and experience, providing a suitable sample from which the survey will draw. The survey is divided into seven categories of tasks identical to the CENTCOM SASO predeployment training task list:

1. Conduct a personnel search
2. Conduct a vehicle search
3. OP operations
4. Convoy operations
5. QRF operations
6. Cordon and Search operations
7. Urban operations

There are not individual tasks under “Conduct a vehicle search” or “Conduct QRF operations” because the individual tasks are repeated in other SASO tasks. The survey was administered online during the week of 20 to 24 March 2006, with permission from the CGSC Quality Assurance Office. All data from the survey can be seen in appendix B, Survey Results Coding Sheet. Of the target population of 1,100, there were 285 respondents. These 285 respondents ranked the 32 individual tasks by order of importance using a Likert scale that included five codes: Very Important, Somewhat Important, Neutral, Somewhat Unimportant, and Very Unimportant. The Likert scale, developed by Rensis Likert, is extremely popular for measuring attitudes because the method is simple to administer (Zikmund 2003, 312). If respondents answer positively to the questions dealing with units seeing the fruits of their work, then conclusions can be drawn about effects-based operations in S&RO.

In the end, the objective of the research design for this thesis is twofold. By gathering information about the predeployment training conducted by mobilized units, the importance of this training can be determined by observing unit success in S&RO. In collecting information about the success in S&RO missions, realigning tasks to reflect soldier's experiences on the ground in Iraq may be determined to be the best way for soldiers to achieve success.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

To begin, the analysis of the results of the survey conducted 20 to 24 March, 2006 is divided into four parts: respondent demographics, respondent answer coding, descriptive analysis, and an application of the analysis to the contemporary operating environment.

Respondent Demographics

In analyzing survey responses, it is important to describe the demographics of the respondents. The survey instrument is available in appendix A, which begins with eleven questions concerning the respondent's experience. Within each branch of service, 235 (98 percent) respondents were in the Army, five in the Navy, 14 in the Air Force, and 5 in the Marines. Of the 285 respondents, approximately 225 (79 percent) have deployed to either Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), or Bosnia. About 59 of the 285 respondents (21 percent) have not been deployed. Of those respondents that have been deployed, 190 (67 percent) were deployed as Captains. 131 (58 percent) of those deployed were in support of OIF, 47 (21 percent) in support of OEF, and 38 (17 percent) in support of Bosnia operations. Most deployments were classified as occurring in the last two years (2003 to 2005).

Of all the branches of the Army, there was much diversity among the respondents. There was also much diversity among the types of jobs in which respondents served while deployed. The average respondent age was thirty-five while the average time in

service was thirteen years. Most respondents were male (91 percent) and most were active duty (89 percent).

Respondent Answer Coding

Upon closure of the online survey on 24 March 2006, all classifications of the training tasks by respondents were transferred from the online questionnaires to the coding sheet in appendix B. Then, the process of recoding began in which data was collapsed in the “Very Important” column with the data in the “Somewhat Important” column. Data was also collapsed in the “Somewhat Unimportant” column with the data in the “Very Unimportant” column. This resulted in two groups of respondents: those who thought a task was important and those who did not. Table 5 shows answers collapsed under these two groups:

After recoding classifications from four to two categories, a comparison was simplified to two groups (Important, Unimportant) instead of four groups (Very Important, Somewhat Important, Somewhat Unimportant, Very Unimportant). This simplification lends a clearer differentiation between tasks that should be included in deployment preparation and those tasks with which a commander may accept risk. Aggregate totals for the “Important” and “Unimportant” columns reveal that most of the training tasks have large gaps between the two ends of the importance spectrum. The neutral column is not taken into account since it counts neither for the unimportant nor the important column. The “Employ a Claymore Mine” task stands out as the only instance where the “Unimportant” column total responses exceed those of the “Important” column. This may be because of exposure to the detrimental effects of the current enemy’s use of IEDs in Iraq. Also of note is the relative unimportance rating

Table 5. Collapsed Respondent Answers

	Important	Unimportant
Conduct a Personnel Search	214	27
Report Enemy Information	228	23
Determine the Grid Coordinates of A Point on a Military Map	211	29
Determine a Location on the Ground by Terrain Association	202	29
Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline	145	51
Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War	218	27
Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft	145	54
Conduct a Vehicle Search	225	26
Conduct OP Operations	195	26
Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment	92	86
Estimate Range	166	37
Employ a Claymore Mine	67	99
React to Indirect Fire While Dismounted	204	30
Select Temporary Fighting Positions	189	27
Clear a Field of Fire	160	42
Perform Surveillance Without the Aid of Electronic Devices	194	29
Use Challenge and Password	135	64
Send a Radio Message	227	21
Conduct Convoy Operations	234	21
Request a Medical Evacuation	237	22
Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound	223	22
Perform Mortuary Affairs Ops	101	72
Conduct QRF Operations	213	22
Conduct Cordon and Search Ops	206	32
Engage Targets With an M4 Rifle	217	23
Engage Targets With an M203 Grenade Launcher	188	30
Engage Targets With an Anti-Tank Weapon	140	39
Engage Targets with an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon	198	34
Conduct Urban Operations	222	29
Employ Hand Grenades	164	34
Move Under Direct Fire	225	24
Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields)	218	25

assigned to “Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment” and “Perform Mortuary Affairs Ops” tasks. These ratings may be due to the nature of recent conflicts and or inexperience with these tasks. At first glance of the coding sheet in appendix B, one would choose “Conduct Convoy Ops” as the most important task since it received the highest “Very Important” score of 200. However, after merging the columns, one can see that “Request a Medical Evacuation” is actually most important based on the number of ratings this task received in both “Very Important” and “Somewhat Important” columns.

Descriptive Analysis

Before a commander can make a list of tasks from most important to least important based on the results of the survey in Appendix A, he should account for disparities inherent in the Likert Scale used on survey question number twelve. One might be inclined to make a list based solely on the training tasks that get the most votes in the “Very Important” column. This would be in error due to the dismissal of the “Somewhat Important” column significance. One would also be in error if they were to make a priority training task list based only on the merged aggregate totals due to the fact that some tasks that scored high in the important columns also scored high in the unimportant columns.

To determine how much more important one training task is than another, one can make a comparison of the ratings of the respondents. As well, if training tasks were equally unimportant, the same would hold true in the unimportant column. Using the following standard deviation formula (Zikmund 2003, 410), one can create a “Task Importance Index” to which all training tasks can be compared to in determining where a certain task falls on a task importance list:

$$S = \sqrt{S^2} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum (X_i - X)^2}{n-1}}$$

$$S = \text{Standard Deviation}$$

$\sqrt{}$ = Square Root

\sum = Summation

X_i = Initial Index Value

X = Mean

X = Sample mean

n = Sample Size (Zikmund 2003, 410)

Standard Deviation Formula with Collapsed Totals and the Resulting Standard Deviation Index of 12.7.

$$S = \sqrt{S^2} = \sqrt{\frac{45774}{284}} = 12.7$$

From this point forward, by calculating how far each task's rating varies from the mean, the importance of new tasks based on where they fall in reference to the mean using 12.7 as a reference is summarized. For example, if chemical warfare suddenly entered the theater as a legitimate threat, a new query of CGSC students done by a party concerned with task prioritization could address the importance of "Reacting to a Chemical Attack." Survey results could reveal a score of importance of 200. Based on a mean of 188, and a standard deviation of 12.7, a score of only 200 would not be considered significant enough to change the scale. Therefore, a commander could place "React to a Chemical Attack" in the task list according to where it falls on the numerical scale, perhaps between "Perform Surveillance Without the Aid of Electronic Devices"

(Score=195) and “Determine a Location on the Ground by Terrain Association” (Score=202). On the contrary, if “React to a Chemical Attack” scored 230, this difference falls outside the standard deviation and would require a new computation of task importance as well as a new standard deviation index. Anytime an addition or deletion to a training task list occurs, the training manager or commander should revisit every task’s importance as it relates to the change. This management process will result in an updated and relevant prioritized task list.

The commander can take the mean and standard deviation to develop his priorities for training. In the next step of analysis, we reorder tasks to match the aggregate list of important tasks while considering the weight of unimportance. To further clarify this dilemma, observe the importance score for “Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields).” This task scored a 218, which is more than the score for “Engage Targets With an M4 Rifle” that scored 217. “Engage Targets With an M4 Rifle” will rate more important because there is less variance in regards to its unimportance score than the larger gap that exists between the obstacle task’s importance and unimportance score.

The resulting list of training tasks most important to soldier success in S&RO in Iraq is shown in table 6.

Table 6. Rank Order Based on Survey Results and Subsequent Column Collapses	
	Rank Order
Request a Medical Evacuation	215
Conduct Convoy Operations	213
Send a Radio Message	206
Report Enemy Information	205
Move Under Direct Fire	201
Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound	201
Conduct a Vehicle Search	199
Engage Targets With an M4 Rifle	194
Conduct Urban Operations	193
Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields)	193
Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War	191
Conduct QRF Operations	191
Conduct a Personnel Search	187
Determine the Grid Coordinates of A Point on a Military Map	182
Conduct Cordon and Search Ops	174
React to Indirect Fire While Dismounted	174
Determine a Location on the Ground by Terrain Association	173
Conduct OP Operations	169
Perform Surveillance Without The Aid of Electronic Devices	165
Engage Targets With an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon	164
Select Temporary Fighting Positions	162
Engage Targets With an M203 Grenade Launcher	158
Employ Hand Grenades	130
Estimate Range	129
Clear a Field of Fire	118
Engage Targets With an Anti-Tank Weapon	101
Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline	94
Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft	91
Use Challenge and Password	71
Perform Mortuary Affairs Ops	29
Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment	6
Employ a Claymore Mine	-32

Application of the Analysis to the Contemporary Operating Environment

During preparation for deployment to a combat theater, the commander must set and enforce priorities for his unit. In doing so, the weight he assigns training tasks will be based on pre-determined criteria. The method the commander chooses to justify which tasks are most important may not be the method that results in success in S&RO. While CGSC students were not given the opportunity to explain their classification of tasks as important or not, the students deemed tasks more important than others nonetheless. Whether classifications were based on personal experience, events given extra media attention, or common sense, the rankings showed a pattern common to the student body as a whole.

A training plan with prioritization of training tasks in accordance with the 285 respondents' classifications gives a focus with credentials. This ranking of tasks by importance outweighs a training plan whose criteria is determined by whimsical methods such as Training and Support Center availability, abiding by the "this is how we have always done it" method, or executing events because they sound good at the time. Determining importance through subjective ranking by an experienced group of subjects such as the CGSC student body sets a precedence commanders can use in preparing their units for S&RO in Iraq.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY

To determine which tasks are important to soldiers in S&RO, commanders have a tool at their fingertips to prioritize tasks in their training plan. Whether leaders are getting ready for deployment or calling an audible in theater, the preparation for an S&RO mission involves the identification and valuation of possible scenarios troops are expected to engage. During the task ranking process, commanders can use historical means of prioritization, or survey a population to determine task importance.

One does not have to go far to find examples of methods commanders have used in the past to determine task importance. In chapter 2, “Literature Review,” it became apparent that a commander could use the CTT model, other theaters of operation task lists, Army Mission Training Plans and various other Army regulations to conceive a method of task prioritization.

Given that there are two instances in which a commander could find himself needing a model to determine task importance: prior to deployment and during deployment. In garrison, one can remove subjectivity from the concept of importance by collecting data against tasks via a survey. By rank ordering tasks in order of importance, a population can decide task importance by comparing tasks to each other. Each respondent will have his own reason for determining task importance, whether it be from personal experience, exposure to media, or cognitive analysis.

Once a commander is in an S&RO environment, he does not have the luxury of conducting a survey and must turn to assigning weight to tasks by using other means.

Frequency of occurrence, task deficiency, and dictation from higher headquarters allow a commander to aptly weight tasks.

If soldiers encounter a scenario not previously addressed in training, and this instance repeats itself, commanders must take an a posteriori approach to the problem. Basing their solution on observations, commanders can, for example, take unit approaches to IEDs and generalize from particular instances. From this induction, a commander can derive a collective task to counter the problem: “React to an IED.” Individual tasks that support “React to an IED” could include marking the site, contacting ordnance personnel, and emplacing snipers. After documenting these tasks, commanders can then compare the individual tasks associated with the newly identified collective task to other tasks developed either in theater or as part of predeployment training to see where “React to an IED” fits in the grand scheme of his unit training plan. It is this identification and ranking that determines what tasks are important to soldier success in S&RO in an “after-the-fact,” or a posteriori sense.

A commander’s unit training records annotates training deficiencies in a unit. These records identify soldiers that are inept at certain tasks. As well, training records show what tasks are not performed well by the unit as a whole. A commander may use this tool to identify important tasks in addition to the task frequency model mentioned above. If an individual soldier has a problem with a specific task, such as qualifying with an individual weapon, the commander has to make a decision. First, the commander may opt to retrain the soldier with special training emphasis until the soldier qualifies. Another solution would be to transfer that soldier to a Military Occupational Specialty other than rifleman so as to reduce the chance of a soldier encountering a situation requiring him to

execute a task at which he is least effective. The least preferred solution to this problem is in accordance with Army Regulation 635-200, Chapter 11-3, which includes a separation policy applicable to soldiers that “cannot meet the minimum standards prescribed for successful completion of training because of lack of aptitude, ability, motivation, or self-discipline” (US DA 2000, 82).

Removing soldiers from the Army due to their inability to qualify on their assigned weapon is the exception, not the rule. It is implied that most soldiers with any training deficiency can be rehabilitated until they overcome their problem. Regardless of the commander’s decision, the soldier’s inability to perform a specific task makes that task important by virtue of its difficulty.

As mentioned before, there may also be tasks in which the entire unit is deficient. This creates a problem the commander must personally address, especially if this task has been deemed important by a system, a higher headquarters, or the contemporary operating environment. For example, an entire company deficient in “Convoy Operations” will likely cause “Convoy Operations” to be at the top of a commander’s training task list. The commander must weigh the risk of being deficient in a task that may or may not be prevalent in the contemporary operating environment. The best thing for a commander to do in this situation would be to notify his leadership of the deficiency and be cognizant of this fact when given a mission involving a convoy operation. By knowing his unit’s weaknesses alone may not save a commander from executing a mission for which he is unprepared, but the identification of the task as important due to its mere deficient rating could raise awareness to a level that allows a unit to react with more success. For example, a unit could merge their convoy with a trained unit, trade

convoy mission for a task with which they are more familiar, or recommend to higher headquarters that the mission not be conducted.

Lastly, the identification of important tasks by a higher headquarters such as the CENTCOM predeployment task list (Center for Army Lessons Learned, CENTCOM list) gives commanders a pre-determined list of theater specific requirements. Training task lists from theater commanders are based on the current operating environment, taking into consideration situation reports, casualty feeder reports and after action reviews. By meeting training requirements set forth by higher headquarters, commanders are likely to satisfy the boss but not necessarily all needs of his unit. The best use of these directed lists is to tailor them to a specific unit and integrate them into unit training plans.

Most importantly, the process of assigning task importance can be applied across a spectrum of tasks once a commander establishes a base against which tasks can be compared in the future. Developing a task list by order of importance gives soldiers a focus during training. A red flag should rise in the commander's purview when a task meets "important" criteria. Whether the task is untrained, frequently occurring, directed by higher headquarters, or a combination of all three of these criteria, its identification is the first step to countering the problem with training. While a list from CENTCOM may direct certain tasks to be trained on before deployment, a shortage of resources may require a commander to prioritize tasks in accordance with a method. The model for task importance determination lends this method.

APPENDIX A


SURVEY INSTRUMENT

This survey measures the importance of training tasks in Army unit preparation for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. All troops deploying to Iraq are required to be trained on specific tasks identified by the Combined Forces Land Component Commander. A study to determine the importance of certain tasks is best served by getting input from you, the CGSC student.

By filling out the survey, you are consenting to allow your answers to be compared to the answers of other service members. This will allow the research to determine whether or not, in the opinion of CGSC students, certain tasks are more important than others and to what degree it affects a soldier's success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations. All answers will be held strictly confidential and anonymous. Your honesty is much appreciated- your answers will contribute to the overall goal of the study.

APPROVED BY CGSC QAO, SURVEY CONTROL #06-006

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq



1

In which branch of service do you currently serve?

☐ Army

☐ Navy

☐ Air Force

☐ Marines

☐ Coast Guard

☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

2

If your branch is Army, in what branch of the Army do you currently serve? (If not in Army, please skip to the next question)

- ☐ Infantry
- ☐ Armor
- ☐ Field Artillery
- ☐ Aviation
- ☐ ADA
- ☐ Engineer
- ☐ Chemical
- ☐ Signal
- ☐ Transportation
- ☐ Quartermaster
- ☐ MI
- ☐ JAG
- ☐ Finance
- ☐ Medical Service Corps
- ☐ PSYOPS
- ☐ CA
- ☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

3

What is your age (in years)?

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

4

How many years of service do you currently have?

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

5

What is your gender?

☐

Male

☐

Female

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

6

In what component of the military do you currently serve?

☐

Active Duty

- ☐ Reserves
- ☐ National Guard
- ☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

7

Are you a veteran of any of the following deployments? (check all that apply-if never deployed, please skip to last question)

- ☐ Operation Iraqi Freedom
- ☐ Operation Enduring Freedom
- ☐ Somalia
- ☐ Bosnia
- ☐ Haiti
- ☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

8

How many times have you been deployed?

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

9

What position did you hold during your deployment(s)? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Company Command
- ☐ Platoon Leader
- ☐ Battalion Staff
- ☐ Brigade Staff
- ☐ Division Staff
- ☐ Corps Staff
- ☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

10

In what year(s) did you deploy? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ 1990
- ☐ 1991
- ☐ 1992


- ☐ 1993
- ☐ 1994
- ☐ 1995
- ☐ 1996
- ☐ 1997
- ☐ 1998
- ☐ 1999
- ☐ 2000
- ☐ 2001
- ☐ 2002
- ☐ 2003
- ☐ 2004
- ☐ 2005
- ☐ Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq


11


What was your rank during your deployment(s)? (Check all that apply)


- ☐ E-1
- ☐ E-2
- ☐ E-3


 E-4


 E-5


 E-6


 E-7

 E-8


 E-9


 E-10

 O-1

 O-2

 O-3


 O-4


 O-5


 O-6


 O-7

 O-8

 O-9

 O-10

 CW1

 CW2

 CW3

 CW4



CW5



Other, Please Specify

Tasks Important to Soldier Success in Stability and Reconstruction Operations in Iraq

12

LAST QUESTION:(Please click the number that best describes your rating of the following 32 tasks). This task conducted during Predeployment Training for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&RO) in Iraq is:

1
Very Important

2
Somewhat Important

3
Neutral

4
Somewhat Unimportant

5
Very Unimportant

Conduct a Personnel Search

1

2

3

4

5

Report Enemy Information

1

2

3

4

5

Determine the Grid Coordinates of a Point on a Military Map

1

2

3

4

5

Determine a Location on the Ground by Terrain Association

1

2

3

4

5

Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline

1

2

3

4

5

Conduct Combat Operations according to the Law of War

1

2

3

4

5

Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft

1	2	3	4	5
Conduct a Vehicle Search				
1	2	3	4	5
Conduct OP Operations				
1	2	3	4	5
Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment				
1	2	3	4	5
Estimate Range				
1	2	3	4	5
Employ a Claymore Mine				
1	2	3	4	5
React to Indirect Fire While Dismounted				
1	2	3	4	5
Select Temporary Fighting Positions				
1	2	3	4	5
Clear a Field of Fire				
1	2	3	4	5
Perform Surveillance Without the Aid of Electronic Devices				
1	2	3	4	5
Use Challenge and Password				
1	2	3	4	5
Send a Radio Message				
1	2	3	4	5

Conduct Convoy Operations

1

2

3

4

5

Request a Medical Evacuation

1

2

3

4

5

Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound

1

2

3

4

5

Perform Mortuary Affairs Ops

1

2

3

4

5

Conduct QRF Operations

1

2

3

4

5

Conduct Cordon and Search Ops

1

2

3

4

5

Engage Targets With an M4 Rifle

1

2

3

4

5

Engage Targets With an M203 Grenade Launcher

1

2

3

4

5

Engage Targets With an Anti-Tank Weapon

1

2

3

4

5

Engage Targets With an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon

1

2

3

4

5

Conduct Urban Operations

1

2

3

4

5

Employ Hand Grenades

1

2

3

4

5

Move Under Direct Fire

1

2

3

4

5

Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields)

1

2

3

4

5

APPENDIX B

SURVEY RESULTS CODING SHEET

Population:100 Respondents: 285 Training Tasks: 32	VIP	SVIP	N	SUVIP	VUIP	TOTAL
Conduct a Personnel Search	120	94	30	14	13	271
Report Enemy Information	162	66	9	6	17	260
Determine the Grid Coordinates of a Point on a Military Map	126	85	30	16	13	270
Determine a Location on the Ground by Terrain Association	112	90	40	21	8	271
Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline	57	88	74	39	12	270
Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War	156	62	24	11	16	269
Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft	64	81	70	43	11	269
Conduct a Vehicle Search	153	72	19	12	14	270
Conduct OP Operations	100	95	47	13	13	268
Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment	31	61	90	58	28	268
Estimate Range	56	110	67	25	12	270
Employ a Claymore Mine	18	49	104	64	35	270
React to Indirect Fire while Dismounted	112	92	33	16	14	267
Select Temporary Fighting Positions	88	101	51	15	12	267
Clear a Field of Fire	65	95	63	28	14	265
Perform Surveillance without the Aid of Electronic Devices	83	111	41	14	15	264
Use Challenge and Password	54	81	69	38	26	268
Send a Radio Message	150	77	21	7	14	269
Conduct Convoy Operations	200	34	11	5	16	266
Request a Medical Evacuation	188	49	7	5	17	266
Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound	156	67	21	10	12	266
Perform Mortuary Affairs Ops	31	70	95	42	30	268
Conduct QRF Operations	113	100	40	7	15	275
Conduct Cordon and Search Ops	133	73	25	15	17	263
Engage Targets with an M4 Rifle	168	49	24	5	18	264
Engage Targets with an M203 Grenade Launcher	97	91	45	12	18	263

Engage Targets with an Antitank Weapon	63	77	81	21	18	260
Engage Targets With an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon	119	79	34	12	22	266
Conduct Urban Operations	175	47	16	9	20	267
Employ Hand Grenades	77	87	68	16	18	266
Move Under Direct Fire	178	47	16	7	17	265
Move Over, Through, or Around Obstacles (Except Minefields)	130	88	21	8	17	264

VIP: Very Important

SVIP: Somewhat Important

N: Neutral

SUVIP: Somewhat Unimportant

VUIP: Very Unimportant

APPENDIX C

DA FORM 5164-R, HANDS-ON EVALUATION SHEET

HANDS-ON EVALUATION		DATE	
<small>(For use of this form, see STP 11-25574-SM-TIG; the proponent/agency is TRADOC)</small>			
TASK TITLE		TASK NUMBER	
ITEM a	PERFORMANCE STEP TITLE b	SCORE (Check One)	
		PASS c	FAIL d
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
		<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> F
EVALUATOR'S NAME		UNIT	
SOLDIER'S NAME		STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> GO <input type="checkbox"/> NO-GO	

APPENDIX D

SURVEY DEMOGRAPHICS

BRANCH OF SERVICE	# RESPONDENTS IN EACH SERVICE
Army	261
Navy	5
Air Force	14
Marines	5

BRANCH OF ARMY	# RESPONDENTS IN EACH BRANCH
Infantry	48
Armor	31
Field Artillery	35
Aviation	27
ADA	3
Engineer	32
Chemical	3
Signal	7
Transportation	8
Quartermaster	21
Military Intelligence	18
Judge Advocate General	2
Medical Service Corps	18
Civil Affairs	4
Other	28

AGE	# RESPONDENTS OF EACH AGE
30	1
32	4
33	17
34	51
35	65
36	38
37	30
38	21
39	19
40	13
41	11
42	2
43	7
44	1
45	1
46	1
48	1
51+	2

YEARS IN SERVICE	# RESPONDENTS WITH CORRESPONDING YEARS
10	9
11	26
12	73
13	49
14	32
15	14
16	22
17	16
18	15
19	4
20	8
21+	17

GENDER	# RESPONDENTS
Male	261
Female	24

COMPONENT	# RESPONDENTS IN EACH COMPONENT
Active Duty	266
Reserves	13
National Guard	6

THEATER OF DEPLOYMENT	# RESPONDENTS
OIF	128
OEF	53
Somalia	3
Bosnia	78
Haiti	14
Other	84

# OF DEPLOYMENTS	RESPONDENTS WITH CORRESPONDING DEPLOYMENT FREQUENCY
0	60
1	71
2	56
3	36
4	28
5	14
6	15
7	3
8	2

POSITION DURING DEPLOYMENT	RESPONDENTS IN THIS POSITION
Company Commander	91
Platoon Leader	55
Battalion Staff	79
Brigade Staff	49
Division Staff	32
Corps Staff	20
Other	75

YEAR DEPLOYED	# RESPONDENTS DEPLOYED IN GIVEN YEAR
1990	10
1991	13
1992	7
1993	9
1994	25
1995	31
1996	51
1997	38
1998	37
1999	35
2000	35
2001	35
2002	42
2003	99
2004	86
2005	58

RANK WHILE DEPLOYED	# RESPONDENTS IN GIVEN RANK
E-4	6
E-5	4
E-6	2
O-1	39
O-2	81
O-3	173
O-4	105

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